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ARTICLES
OVERVIEW OF THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT
PAUL J. POLKINGt
SCOTT A. CAMMARNt
I. INTRODUCTION
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (the "Act"),1 signed into law
by President Clinton on November 12, 1999, represents the cul-
mination of Congressional financial reform efforts spanning
more than 30 years. The Act makes sweeping changes to federal
statutes governing the scope of permissible activities and the su-
pervision of banks, bank holding companies, and their affiliates.
In particular, the Act lowers (although does not altogether elimi-
nate) barriers between the banking and securities industries
erected by the Banking Act of 1933 (popularly known as the
"Glass-Steagall Act")2 and between the banking and the insur-
ance industries erected by the 1982 amendments to the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 (the "Bank Holding Company
Act").3 Some have described the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act as the
most important piece of federal banking legislation since the De-
pression.
t Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Bank of America Corporation.
t Associate General Counsel of Bank of America Corporation and a member of
the adjunct faculty of the Duke University School of Law. The authors wish to
thank Gerald P. Hurst, John H. Huffstutler, Patrick S. Antrim, and.Michael W.
Briggs of the Bank of America Legal Department for their assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article.
1. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(113 Stat.) 1338.
2. Pub. L. No. 73-66, ch. 89,48 Stat. 162 (1933) (as codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
3. The Garn-St German Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (as codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), amending
section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850
(1994).
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Much of the Act, however, is in part a response to years of
financial modernization developments initiated by U.S. bank
regulatory agencies at the behest of the banking industry. For
example:
Both the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem (the "Federal Reserve Board") and the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency (the "OCC") have long permitted banks
and bank holding companies to engage in retail and institutional
securities brokerage, private placement, and investment advisory
activities.
In 1987, the Federal Reserve Board construed the Glass-
Steagall Act to allow bank holding companies to own a subsidi-
ary engaged in underwriting and dealing in "ineligible" securi-
ties, provided the subsidiary was not "engaged principally in"
(defined by the Federal Reserve Board as having less than five
percent - and later, twenty-five percent - of its revenue derived
from) ineligible securities activities. 4
In 1996, the OCC issued new regulations, permitting a na-
tional bank, with prior OCC approval, to own a subsidiary en-
gaged in activities that are impermissible for the bank itself3 and,
in 1997, relied on this regulation to permit a national bank sub-
sidiary to engage in municipal bond underwriting.6
In 1998, the Federal Reserve Board permitted Citicorp, at
the time the largest bank holding company in the U.S., to become
affiliated with Travelers Group, Inc., a diversified financial ser-
vices firm engaged in insurance and securities activities. 7
The OCC in particular has aggressively defended, and
even expanded, the power of national banks to sell insurance and
4. See Federal Reserve Board, Order Approving Applications to Engage in Limited
Underwriting and Dealing Certain Securities, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987); Revenue
Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies En-
gaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (1996); Securi-
ties Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
5. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 FED. REG. 60,363
(1996) (by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
6. OCC Conditional Approval No. 262 (Dec. 11, 1997).
7. See Federal Reserve Board, Order Approving Formation of a Bank Holding
Company and Notice to Engage in Nonbanking Activities, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 985 (1998).
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quasi-insurance products (such as annuities and debt cancellation
contracts). 8
It can be argued, then, that significant U.S. financial mod-
ernization has already taken place while federal financial mod-
ernization legislation remained a victim of political impasse
between the banking, thrift, insurance, and securities industries,
public interest groups, and, in some respects, the federal agencies
themselves.
In any case, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is undoubtedly
significant: the Act expands the statutory powers of banks, bank
subsidiaries, and bank holding companies, alters which (and
how) federal agencies regulate banks and bank holding company
activities through the concept of "functional regulation," curtails
the power of the thrift charter, and imposes privacy restrictions
on entire industries. This Article summarizes the significant pro-
visions of the Act and, in particular, its effect on the activities and
supervision of banks and bank holding companies.
II. EXPANDED POWERS
A. Expanded Powers for Holding Companies
Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, a bank holding com-
pany may elect to become a "financial holding company" and
thereby engage, directly or through a nonbank subsidiary, in any
activity that is "financial in nature" or other activity that is com-
plimentary or incidental thereto. To qualify for expanded pow-
ers, each of a bank holding company's depository institution
subsidiaries must be well managed, be well capitalized, and have
received a Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") rating of "Sat-
isfactory" or better at its most recent examination. 9 The bank
8. See, e.g., U.S. Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America,
508 U.S. 439 (1993) (power to sell insurance from a "town of 5,000"); Barnett Bank of
Marion County., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (preemption of state insurance
laws); NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 251 (1995) (sale of annuities); Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v.
Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164 (1979) (sale of credit insurance).
9. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 103, 1999
2000]
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holding company must file a certification and declaration with
the Federal Reserve Board, and then may directly or indirectly
engage in expanded activities, either de novo or by acquisition,
beginning March 11, 2000.10
The scope of activities permitted to financial holding
companies (i.e., activities that are "financial in nature,") is in-
tended to be significantly broader than the scope of activities
permitted to bank holding companies under the Bank Holding
Company Act" (i.e., activities that are "so closely related to bank-
ing... as to be a proper incident thereto"). 12 Certain previously
impermissible activities are listed in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
as per se "financial in nature" and may be engaged in without
prior notice to the Federal Reserve Board, such as:
Underwriting or dealing in securities (in-
cluding market-making), without revenue
or position limitations;
Organizing, sponsoring, or distributing a
mutual fund;
Making merchant banking investments in
companies, regardless of the activities in
which the companies are engaged, if the in-
vestment activity is conducted through a
securities or insurance affiliate or another
appropriate nonbank affiliate13;
U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.) 1338,1342.
10. See § 161. On January 19, 2000, the Federal Reserve Board issued interim
and proposed regulations setting forth the procedures for a financial holding com-
pany election. See Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 FED.
REG. 3785 (2000) (proposed Jan. 19, 2000).
11. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994).
12. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994).
13. Merchant banking investments must meet certain non-control criteria set
forth in the Act. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103. In addition, if a financial hold-
ing company's merchant banking investment in a company exceeds 15% of the
company's equity capital, the company is presumed to be an "affiliate" for pur-
poses of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371c. See Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act § 121(b). Thus, while a financial holding company may make
merchant banking investments in a company engaged in impermissible (e.g., com-
[Vol. 4
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0 Underwriting insurance (including title in-
surance) and issuing annuities;
0 Selling insurance as agent or broker (includ-
ing title insurance); and
Engaging in the U.S. in any activity which
has previously been permissible abroad
under the Federal Reserve Board's regula-
tions (known as Regulation K)14 or interpre-
tations under the Federal Reserve Act'5 and
the International Banking Act 16 such as
travel agency, real estate brokerage, or
management consulting.17
The Federal Reserve Board is permitted, by regulation or
order, to authorize other activities that it deems to be "financial
in nature" or other activities that are complimentary or incidental
thereto, subject to the concurrence of the Department of Treasury
(the "Treasury").18
As a result of these expanded activities granted to finan-
cial holding companies, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act effectively
permits affiliation between bank holding companies, insurance
companies, and securities firms, under the umbrella of a "finan-
cial holding company." However (except in the case of merchant
banking investments), the Act continues to bar banking and
commerce affiliations, i.e., affiliations between depository institu-
tions and companies engaged in activities that are not "financial
mercial) activities in excess of the 5% limitation set forth in section 4 the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843, the financial holding company's ability to ex-
tend credit to that company through one of its depository institutions would be
severely restricted if the financial holding company's investment exceeds 15% of
the company's equity capital. Merchant banking authority may not be used to ac-
quire more than a 5% interest in a bank, bank holding company, or thrift.
14. See 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1999).
15. See 12 U.S.C. § 221 (1994).
16. See 12 U.S.C. § 611 (1994).
17. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103.
18. See id.
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in nature." In particular, the Act permits a financial holding
company to engage in nonfinancial activities only if the financial
holding company was not a bank holding company prior to No-
vember 12,1999 but became a financial holding company (e.g., by
acquiring a depository institution) after that date, and even so,
permits the financial holding company only to retain commercial
activities subject to certain revenue limits, cross-marketing limita-
tions, and grandfathering restrictions set forth in the Act. As a
result, if a bank holding company (or a financial holding com-
pany that was formerly a bank holding company) is contemplat-
ing a merger with a securities or insurance company engaged in
part in nonfinancial activities, these nonfinancial activities may
be retained only if the insurance or securities firm is the survivor.
Bank holding companies are not compelled to elect "fi-
nancial holding company" status. Bank holding companies that
do not make such an election will continue to be regulated by the
Federal Reserve Board as such, and their permissible activities
will continue be limited to those that are "closely related to bank-
ing" as prescribed by the Bank Holding Company Act and Fed-
eral Reserve Board orders and regulations in effect on November
11, 1999.19 Thus, the permissible scope of non-electing bank hold-
ing company activities is frozen as of the date of enactment of the
Act.
Acquisitions and new activities by non-electing bank
holding companies will continue to require prior notice to or ap-
proval by the Federal Reserve Board, although such transactions
will continue to avoid Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 197620 (the "HSR Act") premerger filing require-
ments (discussed below).21
Whether or not a bank holding company elects financial
holding company status, the bank holding company and its sub-
sidiaries will become subject to the other provisions of the Act, in
19. See § 102.
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994).
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(8) (1994) (partial HSR Act exemption for transactions
subject to Federal Reserve Board approval under section 4 of the Bank Holding
Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843).
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particular, its "functional regulation" and privacy provisions
(discussed below).22
B. Reduction in Federal Reserve Board's Prior Approval
Requirements for New Nonbanking Activities
The Act drastically reduces the requirement that a finan-
cial holding company obtain prior Federal Reserve Board ap-
proval before engaging de novo or by acquisition in new
nonbanking activities. Under the Bank Holding Company Act
and the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Y, a bank holding
company is currently required to provide at least 12 business
days' prior notice before engaging in new activities, either de novo
or by acquisition, if the bank holding company is eligible for ex-
pedited processing and the proposed activity has been previ-
ously deemed permissible by Federal Reserve Board order or
regulation2 3; longer periods apply in the case of ineligible bank
holding companies or with respect to activities that have not pre-
viously been deemed permissible.24 Under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, if the proposed new activity is "financial in nature"
because the activity is either listed in the Act or has been previ-
ously approved by Federal Reserve Board regulation or order
(including Federal Reserve Board orders issued to other holding
companies), a financial holding company must simply provide 30
days' after-the-fact notice to the Federal Reserve Board of the
new activities or acquisition.25 Thus, with respect to bank hold-
ing companies that elect "financial holding company" status, not
only has the scope of permissible nonbanking activities been ex-
panded, but the Federal Reserve Board's prior approval require-
ment for listed or approved activities has been eliminated as well.
With respect to nonbanking activities that are unlisted and have
not been previously approved by the Federal Reserve Board by
order or regulation, a financial holding company must still apply
22. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Title II.
23. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(c)(8), 18430) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 225.23 (1999).
24. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(c)(8), 18430); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.23-225.24 (1999).
25. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103.
2000]
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to the Federal Reserve Board for prior approval.
The Act does not affect the Federal Reserve Board's prior
approval requirements applicable to bank, bank holding com-
pany, or thrift acquisitions. Thus, before acquiring (or establish-
ing de novo) a bank, bank holding company, or thrift, a financial
holding company must apply to the Federal Reserve Board for
prior approval pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act and
Regulation Y.26
The Act does not eliminate all prior approvals in connec-
tion with financial holding company acquisitions, however. If a
financial holding company relies on the after-the-fact notice pro-
cedures of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to make an acquisition,
the financial holding company may be required to file a "pre-
merger notification" pursuant to the HSR Act. Currently, for
nonbanking acquisitions by bank holding companies subject to
Federal Reserve Board notice or approval under Section 4 of the
Bank Holding Company Act,27 there is a partial exemption from
the HSR Act; the acquiring bank holding company merely must
file with the Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC") and the De-
partment of Justice (the "DOJ") a copy of the notice or applica-
tion to the Federal Reserve Board and is thereby exempted from
the HSR Act's 30-day pre-merger waiting period.28 If a financial
holding company relies on the Federal Reserve Board's after-the-
fact notice procedures pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
the financial holding company will not be entitled to this exemp-
tion from the HSR Act, and may be required to submit a pre-
merger notification (accompanied by the required $45,000 filing
fee) to the FTC and the DOJ and endure the 30-day waiting pe-
riod (unless early termination is granted) if the transaction is oth-
26. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994); 12 C.F.R. pt. 225(B) (1999). Thrift activities, al-
though considered by the Federal Reserve Board to be "nonbanking" activities,
were excluded from the Act's list of "financial in nature" activities. Accordingly,
thrift acquisitions continue to be subject to the procedural requirements of the Bank
Holding Company Act and Regulation Y. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103; 12
U.S.C. §§ 1843(i), 18430) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 225.24 (1999).
27. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(8) (1994).
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erwise subject to the HSR Act.29 A separate provision of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act specifies that premerger notifications
will also be required in connection with a financial holding com-
pany's acquisition of another holding company, if the holding
company to be acquired engages, directly or indirectly, in non-
banking activities and that aspect of the acquisition is not subject
to Federal Reserve Board approval under Section 4 of the Bank
Holding Company Act.30 Previously, these transactions were ex-
empted from HSR Act premerger notification requirements (by
virtue of the Federal Reserve Board's approval requirement) and
therefore no premerger notification was required with the FTC
and the DOJ (other than a copy of the Federal Reserve Board fil-
ing) and no waiting period applied.31 Thus, financial holding
companies that acquire another diversified holding company
may be required to file both an application with the Federal Re-
serve Board and an HSR premerger notification with the FTC and
the DOJ.
The Act does not appear to preclude a financial holding
company from continuing to rely on Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank
Holding Company Act to conduct an acquisition, provided that
the activities of the company to be acquired fall within the scope
of the "closely related to banking" as previously defined by the
Federal Reserve Board. In such cases, the financial holding com-
pany could apply for approval to the Federal Reserve Board pur-
suant to Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act and
therefore avoid the HSR Act premerger notification process alto-
gether. Accordingly, for acquisitions involving companies en-
gaged in traditional bank holding company activities within the
scope of Section 4(c)(8), financial holding companies may have
the option of either making a pre-acquisition filing with the Fed-
29. As far as most financial holding companies are concerned, generally the
HSR Act requires a premerger notification and a 30-day waiting period if the com-
pany to be acquired has more than $100 million in sales or $10 million in assets, and
the financial holding company will be acquiring more than either (a) 15% of its vot-
ing stock or (b) voting stock or assets valued at $15 million or more. See 15 U.S.C. §
18a(a) (1994).
30. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 133.
31. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a(c)(7)-(8) (1994).
2000]
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eral Reserve Board and avoiding an HSR Act premerger notifica-
tion, or making an after-the-fact notice to the Federal Reserve
Board pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and complying
with the HSR Act's premerger notification procedures (if the ac-
quisition exceeds HSR thresholds).
C. Expanded Powers for National Bank Subsidiaries
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also expands the permissible
activities of a subsidiary of a national bank. Currently, national
banks may own an "operating subsidiary," which, for the most
part, may engage only in those activities that are permissible for
the national bank itself, i.e., activities that are "part of or inciden-
tal to the business of banking . . .or other activities that are
permissible for national banks or their subsidiaries under other
statutory authority."32 By interpretation and regulation, the OCC
has permitted a national bank to own a subsidiary engaged in
activities that meet the above standard, even though separate
statutory authority precludes a national bank from engaging in
the same activity directly (referred to as a "Part 5 subsidiary").33
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act preserves the existing au-
thority of a national bank to own an operating subsidiary, and in
addition permits the bank to own a "financial subsidiary" - a
subsidiary that may engage in a broader range of activities that
are "financial in nature."34 To qualify to own a "financial sub-
sidiary," the national bank and each of its depository institution
affiliates must be well capitalized, well managed, and have a
CRA rating of "Satisfactory" or better.35 In addition, if the na-
tional bank is one the 50 largest banks, the national bank must
32. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(1) (1999). See also 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994).
33. Rules, Policies and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 FED. REG. 60,363
(1996). An example of an activity considered by the OCC to be the business of
banking, but barred to the national bank itself, is municipal bond underwriting.
See, e.g., OCC Conditional Approval No. 262 (Dec. 11, 1997).
34. Because national banks are limited to owning operating subsidiaries or fi-
nancial subsidiaries, by implication the Act overrides the OCC's Part 5 regulations
and prevents national banks from owning a Part 5 subsidiary unless it qualifies as a
"financial subsidiary."
35. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 121(a).
[Vol. 4
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have outstanding at least one publicly held long-term unsecured
debt issue that is rated within the three highest investment grade
categories. 36 The national bank is not required to be part of a "fi-
nancial holding company" in order to own a financial subsidiary.
The creation (or acquisition) of a financial subsidiary re-
quires the prior approval of the OCC. Unlike the procedure
available for expanded activities for holding company subsidiar-
ies, there is no after-the-fact notice procedure available for finan-
cial subsidiaries.
A financial subsidiary of a national bank may engage in
any activity that either (i) is permissible for the bank itself, (ii) is
listed as "financial in nature" under the Act, (iii) has been deter-
mined by the Treasury to be "financial in nature" (and the Fed-
eral Reserve Board has not disagreed), or (iv) is "incidental" to a
financial activity.37 However, a financial subsidiary may not en-
gage in:
Underwriting insurance (other than credit
insurance) or issuing annuities;
* Real estate development or investment; or
Merchant banking (although five years after
enactment, a financial subsidiary may en-
gage in merchant banking if the Federal Re-
serve Board and the Treasury concur).38
36. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 101, 121(a). If the national bank is among
the second 50 largest banks, the national bank must meet a comparable requirement
to be established jointly by the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury.
37. Curiously, the Act permits a financial holding company to engage in activi-
ties that are deemed by the Federal Reserve Board to be "complimentary" to finan-
cial-in-nature activities. See § 103. The Act does not, however, confer similar
interpretive authority on the Treasury with respect to national bank financial sub-
sidiaries. See § 121. Thus, the Federal Reserve Board has somewhat greater latitude
to expand holding company activities than does the Treasury with respect to na-
tional bank financial subsidiary activities. Nonetheless, the OCC still has broad
discretion under the National Bank Act to determine that an activity is "the busi-
ness of banking" or "incidental" thereto, and therefore permissible for a national
bank or its operating subsidiary.
38. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 121(a), 122.
2000]
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A financial subsidiary therefore may engage in a wide
range of activities previously barred to a national bank or its op-
erating subsidiaries, such as:
Underwriting or dealing in securities (in-
cluding market-making);
0 Organizing, sponsoring, or distributing a
mutual fund;
0 Selling insurance (including title insurance)
outside a "place of 5,000";
* Engaging in real estate lease financing;
• Engaging in real estate brokerage;
* Operating a travel agency; and
* Providing management consulting services.
To protect the deposit insurance system from the in-
creased risk posed by the expanded activities permitted to finan-
cial subsidiaries, a financial subsidiary and its parent national
bank are subject to certain "firewalls," in particular:
A financial subsidiary is treated as an "af-
filiate" for purposes of the affiliate transac-
tion restrictions of Sections 23A and 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act,3 9 and a national
39. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (1994); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 121(b).
However, Section 23A's 10% limit - capping a national bank's "covered transac-
tions" with (generally, extensions of credit to or purchases of assets from) any indi-
vidual nonbank affiliate at 10% of the bank's capital stock and surplus, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 371c(a)(1)(A), will not apply to transactions between a bank and its financial sub-
sidiary. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 121(b)(1).
[Vol. 4
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bank's equity investment in the financial
subsidiary (excluding retained earnings)
counts against the bank's aggregate Section
23A "capacity" 40;
* The bank's equity investment in its financial
subsidiaries (including retained earnings)
must be deducted from its equity capital;
0 The financial subsidiary's assets and liabili-
ties may not be consolidated with the na-
tional bank's assets and liabilities;
* The assets of all of the bank's financial sub-
sidiaries, on a combined basis, may not ex-
ceed $50 billion (indexed for inflation) or
45% of the bank's total assets, whichever is
less; and
* A financial subsidiary is treated as a hold-
ing company affiliate rather than a bank
subsidiary for purposes of the antitying
provisions of the Bank Holding Company
Act.41
The Act also permits FDIC-insured state-chartered banks
to own a financial subsidiary, subject to generally the same re-
quirements, conditions, and firewalls applicable to national
banks.42 Of course, a state bank could not own a financial sub-
sidiary unless permitted to do so by the law of the state in which
the bank is chartered, although many states have adopted "wild
40. Under section 23A, a national bank's total outstanding "covered transac-
tions" with (generally, extensions of credit to or purchases of assets from) all of its
non-bank affiliates may not exceed 20% of the bank's capital stock and surplus. See
12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)(B) (1994).
41. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 121(a)-(c); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1978 (1994).
42. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 121(d).
2000]
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card" statutes that would permit state bank ownership of a sub-
sidiary if a similarly situated national bank could do so.
The financial subsidiary provisions of the Act become ef-
fective on March 11, 2000.43
D. National Banks May Underwrite Municipal Bonds
Well-capitalized national banks (and their subsidiaries) are
permitted to engage in municipal bond underwriting, beginning
March 11, 2000.44 Under existing law, national banks are prohib-
ited from engaging directly in municipal bond underwriting by
virtue of Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act45 (although the OCC
has permitted national banks to own a "Part 5 subsidiary" that
engages in municipal bond underwriting).46
E. Streamlined Supervision and Functional Regulation of Holding
Company Affiliates
The Act confers on the Federal Reserve Board the primary
authority to examine and supervise a bank holding company, fi-
nancial holding company, and their respective affiliates, other
than its depository institution and "functionally regulated" affili-
ates. The "functionally regulated affiliates" (and their respective
functional regulators) are:
For a registered broker-dealer, investment
adviser, or an investment company, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC");
43. See §§ 121(a), 161. Although the OCC has an additional 150 days to prom-
ulgate regulations governing financial subsidiaries, the OCC issued proposed regu-
lations on January 20, 2000, to be effective March 11, 2000. See Proposed
Rulemaking, Financial Subsidiaries and Operating Subsidiaries, 65 Fed. Reg. 3157
(2000).
44. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 151.
45. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994).
46. See, e.g., OCC Conditional Approval No. 262 (Dec. 11, 1997).
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For a state-regulated insurance company,
the state insurance authority; and
For a CFTC regulated firm, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.47
The Federal Reserve Board's authority to require reports
from, examine, or impose capital requirements on a functionally
regulated affiliate of a bank holding company or financial hold-
ing company is significantly restricted.48 Similarly, the authority
of the SEC or a state insurance authority to require reports from
or examine a holding company or a nonbank subsidiary is re-
stricted as well (unless such nonbank subsidiary is functionally
regulated by the SEC or the state insurance authority).49
F. Derivative and Intra-Day Extensions of Credit Subject to Section
23A
Under the Act, the Federal Reserve Board is required to
adopt regulations to address, as covered transactions, credit ex-
posures arising out of derivative transactions between banks and
their affiliates as well as intra-day extensions of credit by banks
to their affiliates.50 Currently, these transactions generally are not
considered "covered transactions" and are not subject to the col-
lateral and arms' length requirements and covered transaction
limits of Sections 23A of the Federal Reserve Act.5'
47. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 111.
48. See §§ 111,113,115.
49. See §§ 111, 112,115.
50. See § 121(d).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1994).
2000]
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III. SECURmES AcTivmEs
A. Repeal of Bank Exemption from Broker-Dealer Registration and
"Push Out" of Securities Activities
Banks currently enjoy an exemption from regulation as a
broker-dealer under federal securities laws.52 The Act's func-
tional regulation provision repeals these exemptions effective
May 12, 2001.53 Because it is impracticable in many cases for a
bank itself to register as a broker-dealer, many of the securities
activities traditionally conducted by banks - including certain
derivative activities - must be "pushed out" into an affiliated se-
curities firm that is otherwise registered as a broker-dealer.
The Act contains certain exceptions to the general defini-
tion of "broker," allowing the bank to continue to effect transac-
tions in certain "identified banking products" without the risk of
SEC regulation or securities law registration - and thereby avoid-
ing a push out. The permissible banking products include:
* Deposits,
* Banker's acceptances,
0 Letters of credit and loans,
* Debit accounts,
0 Loan participations to qualified investorsm
or other sophisticated investors, and
* Swaps (except equity swaps sold directly to
52. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4)-(5) (1994).
53. See Gramm-Leach Bliley Act §§ 201,202,209.
54. The definition of "qualified investor" includes any organization or natural
person that owns and invests on a discretionary basis not less than $25 million in
investments. This amount is reduced to $10 million for loan participations. See
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206.
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persons that are not qualified investors).55
Subject to certain limitations, a bank may also continue in
certain securities activities involving products other than "identi-
fied banking products," without registration as a broker (and
therefore without push out), including:
Third party brokerage arrangements with a
broker/dealer offering services on or off the
premises of the bank, subject to the follow-
ing:
o the broker/dealer is clearly identified as
the person performing the brokerage
services;
o the broker/dealer performs the broker-
age services in an area that is clearly
marked and, to the extent practicable,
physically separate from the routine de-
posit taking activities of the bank;
o any materials used by the bank to ad-
vertise or generally promote the avail-
ability of brokerage services under the
arrangement clearly indicate that the
brokerage services are being provided
by the broker/dealer and not by the
bank;
o any materials used by the bank to ad-
vertise or generally promote the avail-
ability of brokerage services are in
compliance with federal securities laws
before distribution;
55. See id.
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o bank employees (other than associated
persons of a broker/dealer who are
qualified pursuant to rules of a self-
regulatory organization (an "SRO") per-
form only clerical or ministerial func-
tions in connection with brokerage
transactions including scheduling ap-
pointments with associated persons of a
broker/dealer, except that bank em-
ployees may forward customer funds or
securities and may describe in general
terms the types of investment vehicles
available from the bank and the bro-
ker/ dealer under the arrangement;
o bank employees do not receive incentive
compensation for any brokerage trans-
action unless such employees are asso-
ciated persons of a broker/dealer and
are qualified pursuant to the rules of an
SRO, except that bank employees may
receive compensation for the referral of
any customer if the compensation is a
nominal one time cash fee of a fixed dol-
lar amount and the payment of the fee is
not contingent on whether the referral
results in a transaction56.
o the services provided by the bro-
ker/dealer are on a basis in which all
customers that receive any services are
fully disclosed to the broker/dealer;
56. The Act does not address what compensation, if any, may be paid to the
bank itself for the services rendered in connection with activities conducted under a
third party brokerage arrangement, eg., percentage lease payments, etc.
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o the bank does not carry a securities ac-
count of the customer; and
o the bank or broker/dealer informs each
customer that the brokerage services are
provided by the broker/dealer and not
by the bank, the securities are not de-
posits or obligations of the bank, are not
guaranteed by the bank, and are not in-
sured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (the "FDIC").
Trust activities, so long as the income from
those activities is an administration or an-
nual fee, a percentage of assets under man-
agement or a flat or capped per order
processing fee, equal to not more than cost,
or a combination of the foregoing, so long
as the fee is not chiefly incentive compensa-
tion and the bank does not publicly solicit
brokerage business, other than by advertis-
ing that it effects transactions in securities
in conjunction with advertising its other
trust activities. Trading activities resulting
from trust activities must be conducted
through a registered broker-dealer.
Transactions in commercial paper, bankers
acceptances or commercial bills, exempted
securities, certain qualified Canadian gov-
ernment obligations and obligations of the
North America Development Bank, and so-
called "Brady Bonds".
As part of the bank's transfer agency activi-
ties, transactions in the securities of an is-
suer for certain employee benefit plans,
dividend reinvestment plans and issuer
2000]
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plans.
Transactions in securities for the bank's af-
filiates (other than a securities or merchant
banking affiliate). Trading activities must
be conducted through a registered broker-
dealer, however.
* Sweep accounts, in which deposits are
swept into no-load money market mutual
funds.
* Services in which the bank, as part of its
customary banking services, provides safe-
keeping or custody services, facilitates the
transfer of funds or securities in connection
with the clearance and settlement of securi-
ties transactions, or effects securities lend-
ing or borrowing transactions for
customers, provided the bank does not act
as a carrying broker except with respect to
government securities, as defined. Trading
activities must be conducted through a reg-
istered broker-dealer.
Private placement activities, but only if the
bank is not affiliated with a broker-dealer
engaged in underwriting, dealing, or mar-
ket making in any securities, other than ex-
empted securities.
* Municipal securities transactions.
* Certain de minimis transactions (totaling less
than 500 transactions per year not otherwise
[Vol. 4
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exempted above).57
Similarly, the Act contains exceptions for banks to the
general definition of "dealer," including buying and selling secu-
rities for a person's own account, either individually or as fiduci-
ary (but not as part of a regular business), and for investment
purposes (as principal or as trustee or fiduciary). The definition
of "dealer" also contains an exception permitting a bank to issue
and sell asset-backed securities to qualified investors if the
underlying obligations were originated by the bank or its
affiliates or a syndicate of banks of which the bank is a member.58
B. Regulation of New Hybrid Products
The Act prescribes a procedure for determining whether a
new "hybrid product" should be treated as a securities product
(and functionally regulated by the SEC and pushed out from the
bank) or a banking product (and functionally regulated by the
banking agencies and not pushed out). Generally, the Act re-
quires that the SEC consult with the Federal Reserve Board be-
fore determining a "hybrid" product is a "security" subject to
SEC regulation, and provides the Federal Reserve Board with the
opportunity to object to the SEC's determination and to seek ju-
dicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. 5 9
C. Repeal of Bank Exemption from Investment Adviser Registration
Banks also lose their exemptions under the Investment
Advisers Act60 and the Investment Company Act6 so that they
must comply with the same general regulatory structure as do
others when advising and providing other services to mutual
57. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 201.
58. See § 202.
59. See § 205.
60. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 (1994).
61. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 (1994)
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funds and unit investment trusts. 62 Banks may, however, elect to
conduct their mutual fund advisory and related activities in a
separately identifiable department or division ("SIDD") and
thereby limit the regulatory impact to only that portion of the
bank. As a result, either the bank (or its SIDD) must registered
under the Investment Advisers Act, or the bank's advisory activi-
ties must be pushed out to an affiliated registered adviser.
D. Other Restrictions on Investment Company and Investment Ad-
visor Activities
The Act requires any person selling a bank-advised mutual
fund to prominently disclose that the fund is not insured by the
FDIC or any other government agency.63 Also, banks (and their
affiliates) will be prohibited from lending money to bank- (or
holding company-) sponsored funds, except in accordance with
such rules, regulations, or orders as the SEC may, after consulta-
tion with and taking into consideration the views of the Federal
banking agencies, prescribe or issue consistent with protection of
investors.64
The Act imposes more stringent independence require-
ments on the composition of bank- or holding company-advised
investment companies than under current law. The Act expands
the definition of "interested person" for an investment company
or investment advisor to include a person who lends money to or
executes a portfolio transaction for, engages in a principal trans-
action with or distributes shares for a mutual fund, another fund
with the same advisor or otherwise related or an account over
62. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 217 (amending the Investment Advisers Act,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(A)). See also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 215-216 (amending
the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(6), (11)).
63. See § 214. Similar requirements currently exist in the Interagency State-
ment on Retail Sales of non-deposit Investment Products (Feb. 15,1994).
64. See § 212. Currently, section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act requires that
bank extensions of credit to bank- or holding company-sponsored funds be collat-
eralized, at arms' length terms, and within the individual and aggregate lending
limits of section 23A, but does not altogether prohibit such extensions of credit.
Nor does section 23A bar extensions of credit by non-banks to bank- or holding
company-sponsored funds. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1994).
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which the fund's adviser has discretion. In addition, the Act ex-
pands the provisions that bar a majority of directors of a mutual
fund from being employees, officers or directors of a bank to now
bar such mutual fund directors from being employees, officers, or
directors of a bank's subsidiaries and affiliates as well.65
The Act narrows the exemption from Investment Com-
pany Act registration for bank common trust funds; under the
Act, the exemption will continue to be available only to those
bank common trust funds that are not advertised or offered to
the general public except in connection with the ordinary adver-
tising of the bank's fiduciary services. 66 As a result, banks will be
unable to advertise or offer such funds to the general public ex-
cept in connection its fiduciary services unless the common trust
fund complies with applicable investment company registration
requirements.
IV. INSURANCE AcTITvIEs
As mentioned above, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act deems
insurance agency and underwriting activities to be "financial in
nature." State anti-affiliation laws or state laws regulating the
underwriting of insurance that discriminate based on bank hold-
ing company or financial holding company affiliation are ex-
pressly preempted (subject to certain exceptions). As a result, a
financial holding company may freely engage in insurance
agency or underwriting activities on or after March 11, 2000.67
A bank may also engage in general insurance agency ac-
tivities on or after March 11, 2000 through a "financial subsidi-
ary," without regard to the "place of 5,000" location
requirements; however, a bank may not engage in insurance un-
derwriting (other than credit insurance) either in its own capacity
or through an operating subsidiary or a financial subsidiary.68
Once again, state anti-affiliation laws that discriminate based on
65. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 213.
66. See§221.
67. See § 103.
68. See §§ 121, 302.
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bank affiliation are expressly preempted. The Act does not affect
a national bank's (or operating subsidiary's) existing authority to
sell credit insurance, or to sell general insurance in a "place of
5,000" location.69 Likewise, the Act does not affect the power of
State banks to engage in insurance agency activities under state
law, subject to FDIC approval.70
With respect to title insurance, underwriting by nonbank
affiliates is permitted; underwriting by national banks and their
subsidiaries is expressly prohibited (with certain grandfathered
exceptions). Sale of title insurance by nonbank affiliates is ex-
pressly permitted, while national banks and their operating sub-
sidiaries may sell title insurance only in those states in which
state-chartered banks are permitted to sell title insurance.71 A
"financial subsidiary" of an eligible national bank may sell title
insurance in any state. State banks may continue to sell title in-
surance under applicable state law, subject to FDIC approval.
As mentioned above, insurance activities are considered
"functionally regulated," with the state insurance authorities
having primary authority over insurance activities, whether con-
ducted in or under a holding company or a bank.72
A. Preemption of State Insurance Laws
The Act effectively provides that insurance activities,
whether conducted in a nonbank subsidiary, a national bank, or a
national bank operating or financial subsidiary (to the extent
permissible), be regulated under federal and state law in gener-
ally the same fashion. In particular, the Act extends the preemp-
tion standard reiterated by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson (i.e., pre-
empting state laws that "prevent or significantly interfere") 73 to
both banks and nonbank subsidiaries alike. State laws enacted
69. See 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994).
70. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (1994).
71. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 103,121, 303.
72. See §§ 104,111,112.
73. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
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after September 3, 1998 regulating the sale, solicitation or cross-
marketing of insurance are preempted if discriminatory on their
face or as applied (subject to 13 safe harbors).74 When determin-
ing whether a state sales, solicitation, or cross-marketing law "re-
stricts or significantly interferes with" or discriminates against a
national bank or its subsidiary, OCC deference applies with re-
spect to laws enacted prior to September 3, 1998; otherwise, equal
deference applies.75
The Act provides for direct federal appellate court juris-
diction and expedited review of a determination by a state insur-
ance or a federal bank regulator whether a state insurance law is
preempted by federal law. The standard of judicial review is
neutral, i.e., "without unequal deference" to the federal bank
regulator and the state insurance regulator.76
B. Insurance Customer Protection Regulations
The Act requires that the banking agencies adopt federal
consumer protection regulations relating to the sale of insurance,
such as:
* Prohibited sales practices (such as anti-
tying and anti-coercion rules);
Mandatory disclosure requirements (such
as the noninsured nature of the product, its
investment risk, and that a purchase is not
mandatory to obtain credit);
* The requirement that the insurance agent
obtain a customer acknowledgment that the
disclosures have been received;
74. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 104. State laws enacted prior to that date
would be preempted, insofar as they apply to a national bank or its subsidiary, sub-
ject to the criteria set forth by the Supreme Court in Barnett.
75. See § 104.
76. See § 304.
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The physical segregation of the retail de-
posit and insurance sales areas within the
branch;
The payment of referral fees; and
Qualification and licensing requirements.
These federal regulations would apply only to insurance
sales either (i) by a depository institution, or (ii) by third parties
conducting sales at an office of or on behalf of a depository insti-
tution. Conflicting state laws or regulations are preempted, and
the banking agencies are required to inform the state that its laws
are preempted. States may override the preemption if the state
adopts legislation to override the preemption within three years
after receipt of such a notice.
77
The Act also prohibits discrimination in the sale, under-
writing, pricing, renewal, or scope of coverage of insurance based
on the insured's status as a victim of domestic violence, and re-
quires the banking agencies to establish a consumer grievance
procedure to resolve complaints.7 8
V. ELIMINATION OF UNITARY THRIFt HOLDING COMPANY LOOPHOLE
The Act prohibits the formation of "unitary thrift holding
companies," which previously were not required to limit the
scope of their activities to those permitted under the Home Own-
ers' Loan Act of 1933 (the "HOLA").79 All newly established uni-
tary thrift holding companies must now conform their activities
to those permitted under the HOLA. Existing unitary thrift hold-
77. See § 305.
78. See § 305.
79. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461 (1994). A thrift holding company was required to
conform its activities to those specified in section 10 of the HOLA (12 U.S.C. §
1467a) only if the thrift holding company owned more than one thrift. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1467a(c) (1994).
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ing companies (including any unitary thrift holding company
applicant as of May 4, 1999) are grandfathered and may continue
to engage in non-HOLA activities, although their grandfathered
status will not survive a change in control.8 0 As a result, the Act
significantly diminishes the value of the thrift charter to commer-
cial firms that had previously considered chartering or acquiring
a thrift to obtain certain powers conferred on financial institu-
tions (e.g., deposit-taking capability, interest rate exportation
rights, fiduciary powers, etc.) without becoming subject to bank
or thrift holding company activity restrictions. The Act also di-
minishes the value of existing thrifts by making them unmarket-
able to companies other than a thrift holding companies.
VI. PRIVACY
In terms of overall effect, the most significant provisions
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act may be found in Title V, its pri-
vacy provisions. The Act's privacy provisions apply to any "fi-
nancial institution," which, for purposes of those provisions, is
broadly defined to mean any institution the business of which is
engaging in "financial activities" as described in Section 103 of
the Act (adding new Section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company
Act).81 Significantly, because the definition of "financial institu-
tion" does not require that the institution be engaged in these fi-
nancial activities "pursuant to" Section 4(k), the Act's privacy
provisions extend to any entity engaged in financial activities
permissible under Section 4(k), regardless whether the entity is
affiliated with a bank, bank holding company, or financial hold-
ing company. Thus, for example, because extending credit is a
financial activity described in Section 4(k), a retailer that provides
open-end credit accounts or sales finance to its customers will be
a "financial institution" and subject to the privacy provisions in
Title V. Similarly, the Act's privacy provisions will extend to fi-
nance companies, mortgage brokers, loan servicers, credit bu-
80. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 401.
81. See § 509.
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reaus, securities underwriters, broker-dealers, investment advis-
ers, mutual funds, trust companies, travel agents, insurance un-
derwriters and agents, management consultants, financial
couriers, data processors, to name a few, regardless of their af-
filiation with a financial holding company. As the scope of "fi-
nancial activities" under Section 4(k) expands over time (through
Federal Reserve Board interpretation and regulation), the reach
of the Act's privacy provisions will expand as well.
A. Permissible Activity
The Act imposes three broad privacy restrictions on "fi-
nancial institutions": First, unless a disclosure is pursuant to an
exception described below, a financial institution may not dis-
close to a nonaffiliated third party any "nonpublic personal in-
formation."8 2  "Nonpublic personal information" means
personally identifiable financial information which is (i) provided
by a consumer to a financial institution, (ii) results from any
transaction with the consumer or any service performed for the
consumer; or (iii) is otherwise obtained by the financial institu-
tion. Thus, the privacy provisions do not apply to non-consumer
customers and accounts. The definition specifically excludes
publicly available information as that term may be defined in ap-
propriate regulations.8 3
Second, a financial institution may not disclose (other than
to a consumer reporting agency) an account number or similar
access number or code for a credit card or deposit account of a
consumer to any nonaffiliated third party for use in telemarket-
ing, direct mail marketing, or other marketing through electronic
mail.8
Third, a financial institution must provide annual disclo-
sures describing its privacy policy to consumers and whenever
the institution establishes a customer relationship with a con-
82. See § 502(a).
83. See § 509.
84. See § 502(d).
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sumer. The disclosures must describe the institution's policies
and practices with respect to:
the dissemination of nonpublic personal in-
formation to both affiliates and nonaffili-
ated third parties, including the categories
of information that may be disclosed;
the dissemination of nonpublic personal in-
formation of persons who have ceased to be
customers of the institution; and
the protection of nonpublic personal infor-
mation of consumers.
The disclosures must set forth:
the categories of persons to whom the in-
formation is or may be disseminated, other
than the persons to whom the general ex-
ceptions described below apply;
the categories of nonpublic personal infor-
mation that are collected by the financial in-
stitution, regardless of whether it is
disseminated to affiliated or nonaffiliated
third parties;
the institution's policies to protect the con-
fidentiality and security of nonpublic per-
sonal information;
the disclosures required under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (the "FCRA")85;
85. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 (1994).
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the disclosures that are used, if any, by the
institution to exclude information sharing
with affiliates from the definition of "con-
sumer report" under the FCRA.86
The Act creates several exceptions to the general ban on
disseminating nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated
third parties:
1. Disclosure Pursuant to Opt Out
A financial institution may disclose nonpublic personal in-
formation to a third party if:
* the institution discloses in writing or electronic
form (or otherwise as permitted by regulations to
be promulgated), that the information may be dis-
closed to a third party;
" the consumer is given the opportunity before the
information is initially disclosed to direct that the
information not be disclosed; and
" the consumer is given an explanation of how to ex-
ercise that non-disclosure option.
87
2. Services Provided By Nonaffiliated Third Parties
A financial institution may provide nonpublic personal in-
formation to a nonaffiliated third party to perform services for or
functions on behalf of the financial institution. These can include
marketing of the institution's own products or services, or finan-
cial products or services offered pursuant to joint agreements be-
tween two or more financial institutions. The institution must
86. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 503.
87. See § 502(b)(1).
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disclose the arrangement to consumers whose information is dis-
closed, and the third party must agree to maintain the confiden-
tiality of the information.88
3. Other Exceptions
A financial institution may disclose nonpublic personal in-
formation to nonaffiliated parties without complying with the
notice and opt-out provisions under the following circumstances:
as necessary in connection with servicing or proc-
essing a financial product or service requested or
authorized by the consumer, or in connection with
maintaining or servicing the consumer's account
with the institution, or in connection with a securi-
tization, secondary market sale (including sales of
servicing rights), or similar transaction related to a
transaction of the consumer;
with the consent or at the direction of the con-
sumer;
to protect the confidentiality or security of the in-
stitution's records;
to protect against fraud, unauthorized transactions,
claims, or other liability;
for required institutional risk control, or for resolv-
ing customer disputes or inquiries;
to persons holding a legal or beneficial interest re-
lating to the consumer;
to persons acting in a fiduciary or representative
88. See § 502(b)(2).
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capacity on behalf of the consumer;
to provide information to insurance rate advisory
organizations, guaranty funds or agencies, appli-
cable rating agencies of the financial institution,
persons assessing the institution's compliance with
industry standards, and the institution's attorneys,
accountants, and auditors;
to the extent specifically permitted or required un-
der other provisions of law, and in accordance with
the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,89 to law
enforcement agencies, self-regulatory organiza-
tions, or for an investigation on a matter related to
public safety;
* to a consumer reporting agency in accordance with
the FCRA, or from a consumer report reported by a
consumer reporting agency;
* in connection with a proposed or actual sale,
merger, transfer, or exchange of a business or op-
erating unit;
* to comply with Federal, State, or local laws, rules,
and other applicable legal requirements; to comply
with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regu-
latory investigation or subpoena or summons by
Federal, State, or local authorities; or to respond to
judicial process or appropriate government regula-
tory authorities.
90
Significantly, the Act imposes no restrictions on a financial
institution sharing nonpublic personal information with its affili-
89. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401 (1994).
90. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 502(e).
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ates, other than the requirement that the financial institution dis-
close its information sharing privacy policy. Sharing account
numbers for marketing purposes, however, is not permitted
among affiliates.
B. Privacy Rulemaking
The Federal banking agencies as well as other Federal
agencies are charged with prescribing regulations as may be nec-
essary to carry out the purposes of the statute. Such regulations
must be issued in final form not later than May 12, 2000.9' The
statutory privacy provisions will then take effect six months after
the date of the promulgation of final regulations, unless the regu-
lations themselves prescribe a later date.92
C. Relationship to State Privacy Laws
The federal privacy provisions of Title V of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act do not preempt any state statute, regulation, or-
der, or interpretation, except to the extent that the statute, regula-
tion, order, or interpretation is inconsistent with the federal
privacy provisions. However, the Act specifically states that a
state privacy statute regulation, order, or interpretation will not
be inconsistent to the extent it provides greater protections to
consumers than provided under Title V. 9' Thus, efforts in the
states to provide more stringent privacy protections to consum-
ers can be expected.
VII. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
A. ATM Fee Disclosures
The Act amends the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (the
91. See § 504.
92. See § 510.
93. See § 507.
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"EFTA") 94 to require automated teller machine ("ATM") opera-
tors who impose a fee for use of the ATM by a non-customer to
post a notice on the machine and on the screen that a fee will be
charged and the amount of the fee. The notice must be posted
before the consumer is irrevocably committed to completing the
transaction. A paper notice issued from the machine may be
used in lieu of a posting to the screen. No charge may be im-
posed unless the notices are made and the consumer elects to
proceed with the transaction. ATM operators are exempt from
liability if properly placed notices on the machines are subse-
quently removed, damaged, or altered by anyone other than the
ATM operator. These disclosure requirements will become effec-
tive upon the promulgation of appropriate regulations by the
Federal Reserve Board.95
The Act also amends the EFTA to require that an issuer of
ATM cards must provide notice upon issuance of a card that sur-
charges may be imposed by other parties when transactions are
initiated from ATMs not operated by the card issuer. This provi-
sion will also become effective upon promulgation of regulations
by the Federal Reserve Board.96
While most banks already provide similar notices pursu-
ant to requirements under state law, banks will need to ensure
that their disclosures meet these federal standards.
B. Community Reinvestment Act Reforms
The Act contains several significant provisions affecting
bank's compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act (the
"CRA"). 97 The CRA requires that depository institutions help
meet the credit needs of the local communities (especially low- to
moderate-income areas) in which the institutions operate, and
requires bank regulators to assess a depository institution's per-
formance under the CRA before approving "an application for a
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1994).
95. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 702.
96. See § 703.
97. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901 (1994).
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deposit facility" - including bank branch, bank merger, and bank
holding company acquisition applications.98 A bank's CRA rat-
ing also affects a bank's or bank holding company's ability to en-
gage in interstate transactions under the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act99 and, as mentioned above,
the bank's ability to establish a "financial subsidiary" or a bank
holding company's election to "financial holding company"
status pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Community
groups often rely on the CRA as a basis for protesting bank and
bank holding company transactions if the groups believe that the
banks have invested too little in their communities.
To ensure that the CRA's requirements are not being
abused, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act imposes certain require-
ments on any "agreement" made pursuant to or in connection
with the CRA, entered into after November 12, 1999, between an
insured depository institution (or its affiliate) and any nongov-
ernmental entity or person, if such agreement involves the an-
nual payment of more than $10,000 or the loan of more than
$50,000 (with certain exceptions). For purposes of the Act, an
"agreement" does not include any agreement entered into by a
depository institution with a non-governmental entity or person
who has not commented on, testified about, or discussed with the
bank or otherwise contacted the ban concerning the CRA. Nor is
the term intended include individual mortgage loans or other
loans made at rates not substantially below market rates where
the proceeds will not be re-lent.100
Such agreements must be disclosed to the public and to
the appropriate federal banking agency both by the depository
institution (or its affiliate) and by the recipient. In addition, the
recipient must provide to the appropriate federal bank regulatory
agency an annual accounting of its use of the funds received from
the depository institution (or its affiliate).1 1 Because these CRA
98. See 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1994).
99. See Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (as codified in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C.).
100. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 711.
101. See § 711. However, the annual accounting requirements apply only to
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"sunshine" provisions apply only to individuals and entities that
have commented on, testified about, discussed with the institu-
tion, or otherwise contacted the institution concerning the CRA,
it will conceivably be challenged by various groups on First
Amendment grounds.
In an effort to reduce regulatory burden on small banks, a
separate provision of the Act alters the CRA examination sched-
ule for banks having assets of less than $250 million. Small banks
with a CRA rating of "Outstanding" from its most recent CRA
examination will be examined not more than once every five
years; small banks with a rating of "Satisfactory" will be exam-
ined not more than once every four years; small banks with a rat-
ing of less than "Satisfactory" must be examined as deemed
necessary by its federal regulator.10 2 Currently, the typically
CRA examination cycle for these banks is considerably shorter.
C. Thrift Conversion
The Act amends the HOLA to permit any federal thrift in
existence on November 12, 1999 to convert into a national bank
or state-chartered bank, with the approval of the OCC or the state
banking supervisor, as appropriate. 10 3 The converting thrift is
permitted to retain, as bank branches, all of its thrift branches
then in existence. The branches may be retained notwithstanding
any restrictions otherwise contained in federal banking law, in
particular, the McFadden Act (which permits interstate national
bank branch retention upon conversion only if the state in which
the branch is located expressly permits de novo interstate bank
branching).10 4 Because federal thrifts are currently permitted to
branch interstate without regard to state restrictions, 105 the Act
creates an opportunity for an existing thrift to establish multistate
branches and then convert into a national bank, notwithstanding
"agreements" entered into after May 12,2000. See id.
102. See § 712. The federal banking agencies are permitted to deviate from this
prescribed examination cycle "for reasonable cause." Id.
103. See § 739.
104. See 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1994).
105. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(r) (1994).
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remaining restrictions on national bank interstate bank branch-
ing.
D. Miscellaneous Provisions
The Act repeals the restrictions in the Federal Reserve Act
on loans by Federal Reserve member banks that are secured by
stock or bond collateral. 0 6 Limitations on loans to one borrower
imposed pursuant to other statutory authority (e.g., the National
Bank Act) are not affected. This provision removes an anomaly
that prevented member banks from taking stock and bond collat-
eral even when done so out of an abundance of caution.
The Act also amends Section 23B of the Federal Reserve
Act.10 7 Section 23B currently prohibits a bank, either as principal
or fiduciary, from purchasing a security during the existence of
an underwriting if an affiliate is a principal underwriter of that
security, with an exception permitting such purchases if ap-
proved by a majority of the bank's outside directors. 10 8 Banks
that have no outside directors (which is not uncommon in the
case of banks in a holding company structure) have been unable
to utilize that exception. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act revises the
exception to require such purchases be approved only by a ma-
jority of directors, whether inside or outside.10 9
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act will likely result in signifi-
cant changes in the delivery of financial services in the U.S. mar-
ketplace. The Act, signifying the completion of financial
modernization efforts started decades earlier by the U.S. bank
regulatory agencies, eliminates many of the remaining barriers to
affiliation between the banking, insurance, and securities indus-
tries. The Act eliminates these barriers without imposing signifi-
106. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 735.
107. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (1994).
108. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(b)(2) (1994).
109. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 738.
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cant obstacles to customer information sharing among these af-
filiated entities, thereby enabling a financial holding company
efficiently to provide a broader range of services to its overall
customer base. By allowing most "financial in nature" activities
to be conducted either in the holding company or in a bank's fi-
nancial subsidiary, the Act confers on holding companies some
degree of flexibility in structuring these new activities. At the
same time, the Act's functional regulation provisions provide for
a common supervisory scheme for these new activities, wherever
conducted. The long range impact of the Act, however will be-
come evident only after the bank regulatory agencies define the
scope of permissible activities under the "financial in nature"
test, and as these agencies - as well as the SEC and state insur-
ance regulators - adopt regulations implementing the Act and
imposing conditions, procedures, and examination practices for
the newly unified financial services industry.
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